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Abstract: In formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by
terms together with an equational theory, axiomatizing the properties of the cryptographic
functions (encryption, exclusive or, . . . ). The analysis of cryptographic protocols requires
a precise understanding of the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are usually used:
deducibility and indistinguishability. Those notions are well-studied and a lot of decidability
results already exist to deal with a variety of equational theories.
We show that decidability results can be easily combined for any disjoint equational
theories: if the deducibility and indistinguishability relations are decidable for two disjoint
theories, they are also decidable for their union. As an application, new decidability results
can be obtained using this combination theorem.
Key-words: equational theories, security protocols, deduction, static equivalence, combi-
nation of decision procedures
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Algorithmes de combinaison pour de´cider la de´duction
et l’e´quivalence statique
Re´sume´ : En me´thodes formelles, les messages sont repre´sente´s par des termes accom-
pagne´s d’une the´orie e´quationelle permettant de prendre en compte les proprie´te´s alge´briques
des ope´rateurs conside´re´s (chiffrement, ou exclusif, . . . ). L’analyse des protocoles de se´curite´
demande de raisonner sur la connaissance de l’intrus. Deux notions standards sont uti-
lise´es: la de´duction et l’indistinguabilite´. Ces notions ont e´te´ bien e´tudie´es et de nombreux
re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ existent. Ils permettent de traiter une grande varie´te´ de the´ories
e´quationnelles.
Nous montrons que ces re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ peuvent se combiner de`s lors que les
the´ories e´quationnelles ne partagent pas de symboles: si la de´duction et l’indistinguabilite´
sont de´cidables pour deux the´ories disjointes, ces deux notions sont e´galement de´cidables
pour leur union. De nouveaux re´sultats peuvent eˆtre ainsi obtenus en utilisant la proce´dure
de combinaison propose´e.
Mots-cle´s : the´ories e´quationnelles, protocoles de se´curite´, de´duction, e´quivalence sta-
tique, combinaison de proce´dures de de´cision
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1 Introduction
Security protocols are paramount in today’s secure transactions through public channels. It
is therefore essential to obtain as much confidence as possible in their correctness. Formal
methods have proved their usefulness for precisely analyzing the security of protocols. Un-
derstanding security protocols often requires reasoning about knowledge of the attacker. In
formal approaches, two main kind of definitions have been given in the literature for this
knowledge. They are known as message deducibility and indistinguishability relations.
Most often, the knowledge of the attacker is described in terms of message deducibil-
ity [17, 19, 18]. Given some set of messages φ representing the knowledge of the attacker
and another message M , intuitively the secret, one can ask whether an attacker is able
to compute M from φ. To obtain such a message he uses his deduction capabilities. For
instance, he may encrypt and decrypt using keys that he knows.
This concept of deducibility does not always suffice for expressing the knowledge of an
attacker. For example, if we consider a protocol that transmits an encrypted Boolean value,
we may ask whether an attacker can learn this value by eavesdropping the protocol. Of
course, it seems to be completely unrealistic to say that the Boolean true and false are not
deducible. We need to express the fact that the two transcripts of the protocol, one running
with the Boolean value true and the other one with false are indistinguishable. Besides
allowing more careful formalization of secrecy properties, indistinguishability can also be
used for proving the more involved notion of cryptographic indistinguishability [7, 1, 16]:
two sequences of messages are cryptographically indistinguishable if their distributions is
indistinguishable to any attacker, that it to any probabilistic polynomial Turing machine.
In both cases, deduction and indistinguishability apply to observations on messages at
a particular point in time. They do not take into account the dynamic behavior of the
protocol. For this reason the indistinguishability relation is called static equivalence. Never-
theless those relations are quite useful to reason about the dynamic behavior of a protocol.
For instance, the deducibility relation is often used as a subroutine of many decision proce-
dures [20, 8, 12]. In the applied-pi calculus framework [5], it has been shown that observa-
tional equivalence (relation which takes into account the dynamic behavior) coincides with
labeled bisimulation which corresponds to checking static equivalences and some standard
bisimulation conditions.
Both of these relations rely on an underlying equational theory axiomatizing the prop-
erties of the cryptographic functions (encryption, exclusive or, . . . ). A lot of decision pro-
cedures have been provided to decide these relations under a variety of equational theories.
For instance algorithms for deduction are provided for exclusive or [12], homomorphic oper-
ators [13], Abelian groups with distributive encryption [15] and subterm theories [2]. These
theories allow basic equations for functions such as encryption, decryption and digital sig-
nature. Static equivalence is also well-studied. For instance, a general decidability result
to handle the class of subterm convergent equational theories is given in [2]. In [3] some
abstract conditions on the underlying equational theory are proposed to ensure decidability
of deduction and static equivalence. Note that the use of this result requires checking some
assumptions, which might be difficult to prove. This result has been applied to several in-
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teresting equational theories such as exclusive or, blind signature and other associative and
commutative functions.
For all the previous results, decidability is provided for particular fixed theories or for
particular classes of theories. In this paper, we provide a general combination result for both
deduction and static equivalence: if the deducibility and indistinguishability relations are
decidable for two disjoint theories E1 and E2 (that is, the equations of E1 and E2 do not share
any symbol), they are also decidable for their union E1 ∪ E2. Our algorithm for combining
theories is polynomial (in the DAG-size of the inputs). It ensures in particular that if
the deducibility and indistinguishability relations are decidable for two disjoint theories in
polynomial time, they are decidable in polynomial time for their union.
The interest of our result is twofold: first, it allows to obtain new decidability results
from any combination of the existing ones: for example, we obtain that static equivalence
is decidable for the theory of encryption combined with exclusive or (and also for example
with blind signature), which was not known before. Second, our result allows a modular
approach. Deciding interesting equational theories that could not be considered before can
be done simply by reducing to the decision of simpler and independent theories.
Our combination result relies on combination algorithms for solving unification prob-
lem modulo an equational theory [21, 6]. It is closed to the result of Chevalier and Rusi-
nowitch [9], who show how to combine decision algorithms for the deducibility problem in
presence of an active attacker. Their result takes into account the dynamic behavior of the
protocol. Although our combination result for deduction is clearly related to their main
result, how deduction can be combined for disjoint equational theories is not stated in their
paper. Moreover they do not deal at all with static equivalence.
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we introduce notation and definitions as well as the two no-
tions of knowledge. Section 3 provides some material for our combination algorithms. Then
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the study of deduction and static equivalence respectively.
In Section 6, we sum up our results and provide new results obtained as a consequence of
our main theorems. Omitted proofs can be found in the appendices.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic definitions
A signature Σ consists of a finite set of function symbols, such as enc and pair, each with an
arity. A function symbol with arity 0 is a constant symbol. Given a signature Σ, an infinite
set of names N , and an infinite set of variables X , we denote by T (Σ) (resp. T (Σ,X )) the
set of terms over Σ ∪ N (resp. Σ ∪ N ∪ X ). The former is called the set of ground terms
over Σ, while the later is simply called the set of terms over Σ. We write fn(M) (resp.
fv(M)) for the set of names (resp. variables) that occur in the term M . A context C is a
term with holes, or (more formally) a linear term. When C is a context with n distinguished
variables x1, . . . , xn, we may write C[x1, . . . , xn] instead of C in order to show the variables,
and when T1, . . . , Tn are terms we may also write C[T1, . . . , Tn] for the result of replacing
RR n
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each variable xi with the corresponding term Ti. A substitution σ is a mapping from a finite
subset of X called its domain and written dom(σ) to T (Σ,X ). Substitutions are extended
to endomorphisms of T (Σ,X ) as usual. We use a postfix notation for their application.
We equip the signature Σ with an equational theory E, that is, an equivalence relation on
terms that is closed under application of contexts and under substitutions of terms for both
names and variables. We write M =E N when M and N are terms and the equation M = N
is in E. A theory E is consistent if there does not exist two distinct names n1 and n2 such
that n1 =E n2. Note that, in an inconsistent theory, the problem we are interested in, i.e.
deduction (defined in 2.3) and static equivalence (defined in 2.4) are trivial.
Example 1 Let Σxor be the signature made up of the constant symbol 0 and the binary
function ⊕ and Exor induced by the following set of equations:
x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y)⊕ z x⊕ 0 = x
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x x⊕ x = 0
We have that a⊕ (b⊕ a) =Exor b.
Definition 1 (syntactic subterm) The set Sts(M) of syntactic subterms of a term M
is defined recursively as follows:
Sts(M) =


{M} if M is a variable or a name
{M} ∪
⋃`
i=1
Sts(Mi) if M = f(M1, . . . ,M`)
The positions in a term M are defined recursively as usual (i.e. sequences of integers). We
denote by M |p the syntactic subterm of M at position p. The term obtained by replacing
M |p by N is denoted M [N ]p.
2.2 Assembling terms into frames
At a particular point in time, while engaging in one or more sessions of one or more protocols,
an attacker may know a sequence of messages M1, . . . ,M`. This means that he knows each
message but he also knows in which order he obtained the messages. So it is not enough for
us to say that the attacker knows the set of terms {M1, . . . ,M`}. Furthermore, we should
distinguish those names that the attacker knows from those that were freshly generated by
others and which remain secret from the attacker; both kinds of names may appear in the
terms.
In the applied pi calculus [5], such a sequence of messages is organized into a frame φ = νn˜.σ,
where n˜ is a finite set of names (intuitively the fresh ones), and σ is a substitution of the
form:
{M1/x1 , . . . ,
M`/x`} with dom(σ) = {x1, . . . , x`}
The variables enable us to refer to each Mi and we always assume that the terms Mi are
ground. The free names of φ, denoted fn(φ), are those which appear in φ and not in n˜, i.e.
(
⋃`
i=1 fn(Mi)) r n˜. The names n˜ are bound and can be renamed. Moreover names that do
not appear in the free names of φ can be added or removed from n˜.
INRIA
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2.3 Deduction
Given a frame φ that represents the information available to an attacker, we may ask whether
a given ground term M may be deduced from φ. Given an equational theory E on Σ, this
relation is written φ `M and is axiomatized by the following rules:
if ∃x ∈ dom(σ) s.t. xσ = M
νn˜.σ `M
s 6∈ n˜
νn˜.σ ` s
φ `M1 . . . φ `M`
f ∈ Σ
φ ` f(M1, . . . ,M`)
φ `M
M =E M
′
φ `M ′
Intuitively, the deducible messages are the messages of φ and the names that are not pro-
tected in φ, closed by equality in E and closed by application of function symbols. Note
that that φ and M might be built on a signature Σ′, possibly larger that Σ. Since the
deducible messages depend on the underlying equational theory, we write `E when E is not
clear from the context. When νn˜.σ `M , any occurrence of names from n˜ in M is bound
by νn˜. So νn˜.σ `M could be formally written νn˜.(σ `M). It is easy to prove by induction
the following characterization of deduction.
Lemma 1 (characterization of deduction) Let M be a ground term and νn˜.σ be a
frame. Then νn˜.σ `E M if and only if there exists a term ζ such that fn(ζ) ∩ n˜ = ∅
and ζσ =E M . Such a term ζ is a recipe of the term M .
Example 2 Consider the signature Σenc = {dec, enc, pair, proj1, proj2}. The symbols dec, enc
and pair are functional symbols of arity 2 that represent respectively the decryption, encryp-
tion and pairing functions whereas proj1 and proj2 are functional symbols of arity 1 that
represent the projection function on respectively the first and the second component of a
pair. As usual, we may write 〈x, y〉 instead of pair(x, y). The equational theory of pairing
and symmetric encryption, denoted by Eenc, is defined by the following equations:
dec(enc(x, y), y) = x, proj1(〈x, y〉) = x and proj2(〈x, y〉) = y.
Let φ = νk, s1.{enc(〈s1,s2〉,k)/x1 ,
k/x2}. We have φ ` k, φ ` s1 and φ ` s2. Indeed x2,
proj1(dec(x1, x2)) and s2 are recipes of the terms k, s1 and s2 respectively.
We say that the deduction is decidable for the equational theory (Σ,E) if the following
problem is decidable.
Entries A frame φ and a term M built on Σ
Question φ `E M ?
2.4 Static equivalence
Deduction does not always suffice for expressing the knowledge of an attacker, as discussed
in the introduction. Sometimes, the attacker can deduce exactly the same set of terms from
two different frames but he could still be able to tell the difference between these two frames.
RR n
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Definition 2 (static equivalence) Let φ be a frame and M and N be two terms. We say
that M and N are equal in the frame ϕ under the theory E, and write (M =E N)ϕ, if there
exists n˜ such that φ = νn˜.σ, (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ n˜ = ∅ and Mσ =E Nσ. We say that two
frames ϕ = νn˜.σ and ϕ′ = νn˜.σ′ are statically equivalent w.r.t. (Σ,E), and write ϕ ≈E ϕ′
(or shortly ϕ1 ≈ ϕ2) when dom(ϕ) = dom(ϕ′), and
∀M,N ∈ T (Σ,X ) we have that (M =E N)ϕ ⇔ (M =E N)ϕ′.
Example 3 Consider the equational theory (Σenc,Eenc) provided in Example 2. Let ϕ =
νk.σ, ϕ′ = νk.σ′ where σ = {enc(s0,k)/x1 ,
k/x2}, σ
′ = {enc(s1,k)/x1 ,
k/x2}. Intuitively, s0 and
s1 could be the two possible (public) values of a vote. We have dec(x1, x2)σ =Eenc s0 whereas
dec(x1, x2)σ
′ 6=Eenc s0. Therefore we have ϕ 6≈ ϕ
′. However, note that νk.{enc(s0,k)/x1} ≈ νk.{
enc(s1,k)/x1}.
Let (Σ,E) be an equational theory. We define EqE(φ) to be the set of equations satisfied
by the frame φ = νn˜.σ in the equational theory E:
EqE(φ) = {(M,N) ∈ T (Σ,X )
2 | (M =E N)φ}.
We write ψ |= EqE(φ) if (M =E N)ψ for any (M,N) ∈ EqE(φ).
Checking for static equivalence is clearly equivalent to checking whether the frames satisfy
each other equalities.
Lemma 2 (characterization of static equivalence) Let φ1 = νn˜.σ1 and φ2 = νn˜.σ2 be
two frames. We have
φ1 ≈E φ2 ⇔ φ2 |= EqE(φ1) and φ1 |= EqE(φ2).
We say that the static equivalence is decidable for the equational theory (Σ,E) if the
following problem is decidable.
Entries Two frames φ1 and φ2 built on Σ
Question φ1 ≈E φ2 ?
3 Material for combination algorithms
We consider two equational theories (Σ1,E1) and (Σ2,E2) that are disjoint (Σ1 ∩ Σ2 = ∅)
and consistent. We denote by Σ the union of the signatures Σ1 and Σ2 and by E the union
of the equations E1 and E2.
3.1 Factors, Subterms
We denote by sign(·) the function that associates to each term M , the signature (Σ1 or Σ2)
of its root symbol. For M ∈ N ∪X , we define sign(M) = ⊥, where ⊥ is a new symbol. The
term N is alien to M if sign(N) 6= sign(M). We now introduce our notion of subterms. This
notion is also used in [9].
INRIA
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Definition 3 (factors, subterms) Let M ∈ T (Σ,X ). The factors of M are the maximal
syntactic subterms of M that are alien to M . This set is denoted Fct(M). The set of its
subterms, denoted St(M), is defined recursively by
St(M) = {M} ∪
⋃
N∈Fct(M)
St(N)
These notations are extended as expected to sets of terms and frames.
Let M ∈ T (Σ,X ). The size |M | of a term M is defined |M | = 0 if M is a name or a variable
and by 1 +
∑n
i=1 |Ni| if M = C[N1, . . . , Nn] where C is a context built on Σ1 (or Σ2) and
N1, . . .Nn are the factors of M .
Example 4 Consider the equational theories Eenc and Exor. Let M be the term dec(〈n1 ⊕
〈n2, n3〉, proj1(n1 ⊕ n2)〉, n3). The term n1 ⊕ 〈n2, n3〉 is a syntactic subterm of M alien
to M since sign(n1 ⊕ 〈n2, n3〉) = Σxor and sign(M) = Σenc. We have that Fct(M) =
{n1 ⊕ 〈n2, n3〉, n1 ⊕ n2, n3}, St(M) = Fct(M) ∪ {M, n1, n2, 〈n2, n3〉} and |M | = 4.
3.2 Ordered rewriting
Most of the definitions and results in this subsection are borrowed from [10] since we use
similar techniques. We consider the notion of ordered rewriting defined in [14], which is a
useful tool that has been used (e.g. [6]) for proving correctness of combination of unification
algorithms. Let < be a simplification ordering1 on ground terms assumed to be total and
such that the minimum for < is a name nmin and the constant in Σ are smaller than any
non-constant ground term. We define Σ0 to be the set of the constant symbols of Σ1 and
Σ2 plus the name nmin.
Given a possibly infinite set of equations O we define the ordered rewriting relation→O
by M →O M ′ if and only if there exists an equation N1 = N2 ∈ O, a position p in M and a
substitution τ such that:
M = M [N1τ ]p, M
′ = M [N2τ ]p and N1τ > N2τ .
It has been shown (see [14]) that by applying the unfailing completion procedure to a set
of equations E we can derive a (possibly infinite) set of equations O such that on ground
terms:
1. the relations =O and =E are equal on T (Σ),
2. the rewriting system →O is convergent on T (Σ).
Applying unfailing completion to E = E1 ∪ E2, it is easy to notice [6] that the set of gener-
ated equations O is the disjoint union of the two systems O1 and O2 obtained by applying
unfailing completion procedures to E1 and to E2 respectively. The relation →O being con-
vergent on ground terms we can define M↓O (or shortly M↓) as the unique normal form of
1By definition < satisfies that for all ground terms M,N1,N2 such that N1 < M [N1] and N1 < N2, we
have M [N1] < M [N2].
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the ground term M for →O. We denote by M↓E1 (resp. M↓E2) the unique normal form of
the ground term M for →O1 (resp. →O2).
We have the following lemmas which are classical results (see [10]).
Lemma 3 Let M be a non-constant ground term such that all its factors are in normal
form. Then
  either M↓ ∈ Σ0 ∪ Fct(M),
  or sign(M) = sign(M↓) and Fct(M↓) ⊆ Σ0 ∪ Fct(M).
Looking more carefully at the proof of Lemma 3 given in [10], we easily deduce the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let M be a non-constant ground term such that sign(M) = Σi (i = 1, 2) and all
its factors are in normal form. Then M↓ = M↓Ei .
3.3 Normalization and replacements
If Π is a set of positions in a term M , we denote by M [Π ← N ] the term obtained by
replacing any term at some position in Π by N . We denote by δN,N ′ the replacement of
the occurrences of N which appears at a subterm position by N ′. It is easy to establish the
following lemma (see [10]).
Lemma 5 Let M be a term such that its factors are in normal form. Let N ∈ Fct(M) and
N ′ be a term alien to M . We have that (MδN,N ′)↓ = ((M↓)δN,N ′)↓).
Example 5 Consider the equational theories Eenc and Exor.
Let M = dec(enc(〈n1 ⊕ n2, n1 ⊕ n2 ⊕ n3〉, n1 ⊕ n2), n1 ⊕ n2), N = n1 ⊕ n2 and N ′ = n. We
have that
  MδN,N ′ = dec(enc(〈n, n1 ⊕ n2 ⊕ n3〉, n), n),
  M↓δN,N ′ = 〈n, n1 ⊕ n2 ⊕ n3〉.
Hence, we have that MδN,N ′↓ = M↓δN,N ′↓.
Let ρ : F → n˜F is a replacement (that is a function) from a finite set of terms F to
names n˜F . Let F = {t1, . . . , tk} such that whenever ti is a syntactic subterm of tj implies
i > j. For any term M , we denote by Mρ the term obtained by replacing in M (in an order
that is consistent with the subterm relation) any subterm N that is equal to some N ′ ∈ F
by ρ(N ′). Formally, Mρ = (Mδt1,ρ(t1)) · · · δtk ,ρ(tk). This extends in a natural way to set of
terms, substitutions, frames . . .
Example 6 Consider the equational theories Eenc and Exor and the term t = dec(〈n1 ⊕
〈n1 ⊕ n2, n3〉, proj1(n1 ⊕ n2)〉, n1 ⊕ n2). Let ρ2 be the replacement {n1 ⊕ 〈n1 ⊕ n2, n3〉 →
k1, n1 ⊕ n2 → k2}. tρ2 = dec(〈k1, proj1(k2)〉, k2).
INRIA
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4 Combining algorithms for deduction
This section is devoted to the (sketch of) proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let (Σ1,E1) and (Σ2,E2) be two consistent equational theories such that Σ1 ∩
Σ2 = ∅. If deduction is decidable for (Σ1,E1) and (Σ2,E2) then deduction is decidable for
(Σ1 ∪ Σ2,E1 ∪ E2).
Our algorithm consists in reducing the problem to decide whether φ `E M (E = E1∪E2)
to several deduction problems. Each of them will be solved either in the equational theory E1
or in the theory E2. Our procedure first relies on the existence of a local proof of φ `M
which involves only terms in St(φ,M).
Lemma 6 (locality lemma) Let φ = νn˜.σ be a frame and M be a ground term built on
Σ and in normal form. If φ `E M then there exists a term ζ on Σ such that
  fn(ζ) ∩ n˜ = ∅ and ζσ =E M ,
  for all ζ ′ ∈ St(ζ), we have ζ ′σ↓ ∈ St(φ,M) ∪ Σ0.
Moreover, if sign(ζ ′) 6= sign(ζ ′σ↓), we have ζ ′σ↓ ∈ St(φ) ∪ Σ0.
Example 7 Consider again the equational theories Eenc and Exor, the frame φ = νn2, n3.{enc(〈n1⊕n2,n3〉,n4)/x1}
and M = n2⊕n3. We have that φ `M . The recipe ζ = proj1(dec(x1, n4))⊕proj2(dec(x1, n4))⊕
n1 satisfies the conditions given in Lemma 6.
We also need to decide deducibility in the theory E1 (resp. E2) for terms built on Σ1∪Σ2.
Therefore, we show that we can abstract the alien factors by new names.
Lemma 7 Let φ be a frame and M be a ground term built on Σ and in normal form.
Let F2 = {N | N ∈ St(φ,M) and sign(N) = Σ2}, n˜F2 be a set of names, distinct from the
names occurring in φ and M , of same cardinality as F2 and ρ2 : F2 → n˜F2 be a bijection.
We have that
φ `E1 M if and only if νn˜F2 .(φ `E1 M)
ρ2 .
A similar result holds by inverting the indices 1 and 2.
We show the lemmas above (see Appendix) by using Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 stated in
Section 3. Then, we proceed by saturation of φ by the subterms in St(φ,M) which are
deducible either in (Σ1,E1) or in (Σ2,E2).
Algorithm. Given a frame φ and a term M , we saturate φ as follows.
  We start with φ0 = φ ∪ Σ0.
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  For any term T ∈ St(φ,M), if νn˜F2 .(φk `E1 T )
ρ2 or νn˜F1 .(φk `E2 T )
ρ1 where
F1, F2, ρ1, ρ2 are defined like in Lemma 7, we add T in the set of deducible subterms:
φk+1 = φk ∪ {T}.
We start over the procedure until there is no more T ∈ St(φ,M) such that νn˜F2 .(φk `E1 M)
ρ2
or νn˜F1 .(φk `E1 M)
ρ1 . Let φ∗ be the saturated set. Using Lemma 6, we can show that φ∗
contains exactly the set of all deducible subterms of St(φ,M). We deduce that φ `E1∪E2 M
if and only if M ∈ φ∗.
Example 8 Consider again Example 7, we successively add in the frame the terms n1⊕n2,
n3 and n2 ⊕ n3.
Complexity. Our reduction is polynomial. Our notion of size for terms was introduced for
proving our lemmas by induction. It does not correspond to the actual size of a term since our
notion of subterms does not take into account intermediate syntactic subterms. In addition,
complexity results for deduction and static equivalence are usually given as function of the
DAG-size of the terms. Thus we express the complexity of our procedure as function of the
DAG-size. The DAG-size of a term T , denoted tdag(t), is the number of distinct syntactic
subterms. We assume that φ `Ei M can be decided in time fi(tdag(φ) + tdag(M)) where
fi : N→ R, i ∈ {1, 2}. Saturating φ requires at most |St(φ,M)| ≤ tdag(φ)+tdag(M) steps. At
each step, we check whether νn˜F2 .(φk `E1 T )
ρ2 or νn˜F1 .(φk `E2 T )
ρ1 for each T ∈ St(φ,M).
We deduce that φ∗ can be computed in time O((tdag(φ)+tdag(M))2[f1(2(tdag(φ)+tdag(M)))+
f2(2(tdag(φ) + tdag(M)))]). In particular, if deciding `Ei can be done in polynomial time for
i ∈ {1, 2} then deciding `E1∪E2 is also polynomial.
5 Combination algorithm for static equivalence
This section is devoted to the (sketch of) proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let (Σ1,E1) and (Σ2,E2) be two equational theories such that Σ1 ∩ Σ2 = ∅. If
deduction and static equivalence are decidable for (Σ1,E1) and (Σ2,E2) then static equiva-
lence is decidable for (Σ1 ∪ Σ2,E1 ∪ E2).
We more precisely show that whenever static equivalence is decidable for (Σ1,E1) and (Σ2,E2)
and deduction is decidable for (Σ,E), then static equivalence is decidable for (Σ,E) where
Σ = Σ1∪Σ2 and E = E1∪E2. Thanks to our combination result for deduction (Theorem 1),
we know it is sufficient for deduction to be decidable for (Σ1,E1) and (Σ2,E2). Note that the
decidability of `Ei is not necessarily a consequence of the decidability of ≈Ei . The encoding
proposed in [3] works only when there exists a free function symbol in Σ1.
Our decision procedure works as follows. We first add to the frames all their deducible
subterms. This is the reason why we require the decidability of `E. Then, we show that
to decide whether φ1 |= EqE(φ2), it is sufficient to check whether φ1 |= EqE1(φ2) and
φ1 |= EqE2(φ2). Lastly, we abstract alien subterms by fresh names in order to reduce the
signature.
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5.1 Step 1: adding deducible subterms to the frames
Given φ1 = νn˜.σ1 and φ2 = νn˜.σ2 such that dom(φ1) = dom(φ2), we define the frame φ2
φ1
by extending φ2 with deducible terms.
φ2
φ1 def
= φ2 ∪ {ζ1σ2↓/x1 , . . . ,
ζnσ2↓ /xn}
where ζi is a recipe of ti, i.e. ζiσ1↓ = ti and fn(ζi) ∩ (n˜1 ∪ n˜2) such that:
  ti ∈ St(φ1) ∪ Σ0, and
  ti is not in the image of φ1, that is ti 6= xσ for any x ∈ dom(φ1).
In particular, we have that φ
φ
= φ ∪ {t1/x1 , . . . ,
tn /xn} where ti are the deducible sub-
terms of φ. When φ
φ
= φ, we say that a frame φ contains all its deducible subterms.
Example 9 Consider the frame φ = νn2, n3.{enc(〈n1⊕n2,n3〉,n4)/x1} given in Example 7. We
have that
φ
φ
= νn2, n3.{
enc(〈n1⊕n2,n3〉,n4)/x1 ,
n1⊕n2/x2 ,
n2/x3 ,
n3/x4 ,
n1/x5 ,
n4/x6 ,
0/x7}.
The following lemma ensures that extending frames preserves static equivalence.
Lemma 8 Let φ1 and φ2 be two frames such that dom(φ1) = dom(φ2). For any frame ψ
such that dom(ψ) = dom(φ1), we have that
φ2
ψ
|= EqE(φ1
ψ
) if and only if φ2 |= EqE(φ1).
In particular, we deduce that φ1 ≈E φ2 if and only if φ1
φ2
≈E φ2
φ2
. Since φ1
φ2
may not
contain all its deducible subterms, we need to extend again the frames with the deducible
subterms of φ1
φ2
. However, (φ2
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
might not contains its deducible subterms anymore.
Lemma 9 states that actually, extending a frame preserves the property of containing all its
deducible subterms. The proof of this lemma relies on the locality lemma (Lemma 6) stated
in Section 4.
Lemma 9 Let φ be a frame such that φ
φ
= φ and ψ be any frame such that dom(ψ) =
dom(φ). Let φ′ = φ
ψ
. We have that φ′ contains all its deducible subterms, i.e. φ′
φ′
= φ′.
Thanks to Lemma 8, we deduce that deciding whether φ1 ≈E φ2 is thus equivalent to
deciding whether (φ1
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
≈E (φ2
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
where (φ1
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
and (φ2
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
contain
all their deducible subterms.
Computing φ
ψ
. To compute φ
ψ
, we not only need to compute that the set of deducible
subterms of ψ but for each deducible subterm T of ψ, we need to compute a recipe ζT such
that (ζT =E T )ψ. Such a recipe can usually be deduced from the decision algorithm applied
to ψ `E T [2]. However, if it is not the case, once we know that ψ `E T (using the decision
algorithm), we can enumerate all the recipes until we find ζ such that (ζT =E T )ψ.
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5.2 Step 2: Checking for equalities in EqEi
Checking for φ ≈E ψ is equivalent to checking for φ |= EqE(ψ) and ψ |= EqE(φ). We show
that checking for ψ |= EqE(φ) can actually be done using only equalities in E1 and E2.
Proposition 1 Let φ and ψ be two frames such that φ
φ
= φ. We have that ψ |= EqE(φ) if
and only if ψ |= EqE1(φ) and ψ |= EqE2(φ).
It is straightforward that ψ |= EqE(φ) implies ψ |= EqE1(φ) and ψ |= EqE2(φ). The converse
is more difficult. We first introduce some ordering on pair of terms. We have (M,N) <
(M ′, N ′) if
(max(|M |, |N |), |M |+ |N |) <lex (max(|M ′|, |N ′|), |M ′|+ |N ′|)
where<lex is the lexicographic order. Now, assuming that ψ |= EqE1(φ) and ψ |= EqE2(φ), we
show by induction on the order on (M,N) that (M,N) ∈ EqE(φ) implies (M,N) ∈ EqE(ψ).
The key lemma for the induction step is as follows.
Lemma 10 Let φ be a frame such that φ
φ
= φ and ψ be a frame such that ψ |= EqE1(φ)
and ψ |= EqE2(φ). Let (M,N) ∈ EqE(φ) and assume that for all terms M
′, N ′ such that
(M ′, N ′) < (M,N), we have that
(M ′ =E N
′)φ⇒ (M ′ =E N ′)ψ.
Let φ = νn˜.σ such that (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ n˜ = ∅. If there exists ζ ∈ St(M) such
that sign(ζσ) 6= sign(ζσ↓), then there exists M1 such that |M1| < |M |, (M =E M1)φ
and (M =E M1)ψ.
5.3 Step 3: Abstraction of alien subterms
Since ψ and φ are built on Σ (and not on Σi), we cannot check whether ψ ≈Ei φ using
the decision algorithm for ≈Ei . We show however that we can simply abstract the alien
subterms by fresh names.
Lemma 11 Let φ and ψ be two frames built on Σ and in normal form. Let F2 = {N ∈
St(φ ∪ ψ) | sign(N) = Σ2}, n˜F2 be a set of names, distinct from the names occurring in φ
and ψ, of same cardinality as F2 and ρ2 : F2 → n˜F a replacement. We have that
φ |= EqE1(ψ) if and only if νn˜F2 .φ
ρ2 |= EqE1(νn˜F2 .ψ
ρ2)
A similar result holds when inverting the indices 1 and 2.
5.4 Combination algorithm for static equivalence
To sum up, checking for φ1 ≈E φ2 is performed in two steps:
1. Computing φ′1 = (φ1
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
and φ′2 = (φ2
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
.
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2. checking for νn˜F2 .(φ
′
1)
ρ2 ≈E1 νn˜F2 .(φ
′
2)
ρ2 and νn˜F1 .(φ
′
1)
ρ1 ≈E2 νn˜F1 .(φ
′
2)
ρ1 .
Complexity. The complexity of the procedure mostly depends on the complexity of com-
puting φ′1 and φ
′
2 and on their size. In particular, it depends on the time for computing
recipes and on their size. Assume that
  φ `E M can be decided in f3(tdag(φ) + tdag(M)),
  a recipe ζ such that (ζ =E M)φ can be computed in f4(tdag(φ)+ tdag(M)) and that we
control the size of the recipe tdag(ζ) ≤ f5(tdag(φ) + tdag(M))
  φ ≈Ei ψ can be decided in fi(tdag(φ) + tdag(M)) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then it is easy to check that φ ≈E ψ can be decided in time polynomial in the fi(tdag(φ) +
tdag(M)) with i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. In particular, if the fi are polynomial, ≈E is decidable in
polynomial time.
6 Application to new decidability results
Deduction and static equivalence are decidable in polynomial time (in the DAG-size of the
inputs) for any convergent subterm theory [2]. A convergent subterm theory is an equational
theory induced by a finite set of equations of the form u = v where v is a subterm of u or v is
a constant and such that the associate rewriting system is convergent. For example, Eenc is
a convergent subterm theory. From [4], we also know that deduction and static equivalence
are decidable in polynomial time for the equational theory Exor of the exclusive or. Applying
Theorems 1 and 2, we get the following new decidability result.
Proposition 2 Let E be a convergent subterm theory. Deduction and static equivalence are
decidable in polynomial time for E ∪ Exor.
Since deduction and static equivalence are also decidable for the theory of blind signature
and the theory of associativity [4], we get that deduction and static equivalence are decidable
for any combination of these theories.
As further work, we consider extending our combination result for non disjoint theories.
This would allow us to consider challenging theories like modular exponentiation or simply
Diffie-Hellman. We might use for example a notion of hierarchy between theories like in [11].
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A Proofs of Section 4
Lemma 6 (locality lemma) Let φ = νn˜.σ be a frame and M be a ground term built on
Σ and in normal form. If φ `E M then there exists a term ζ on Σ such that
  fn(ζ) ∩ n˜ = ∅ and ζσ =E M ,
  for all ζ ′ ∈ St(ζ), we have ζ ′σ↓ ∈ St(φ,M) ∪ Σ0.
Moreover, if sign(ζ ′) 6= sign(ζ ′σ↓), we have ζ ′σ↓ ∈ St(φ) ∪ Σ0.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that there exists a term built on Σ satisfying the first condition.
We choose one, say that ζ ′M , whose size is minimal. Let ζM be the term obtained from ζ
′
M
after replacing every occurrence of a name n 6∈ St(φ,M) by nmin. Since E is stable under
substitution of names, from the fact that ζ ′Mσ =E M , we easily deduce that ζMσ =E M .
Now, we establish (by induction) that such a ζM satisfies the second condition.
Base case: ζM is a name, a variable or a term built over Σ1 (resp. Σ2) only. In such a case,
we easily conclude since St(ζM ) = {ζM}.
Induction step: There exist ζ0, ζ1, . . . , ζ` such that
  ζ = ζ0[ζ1, . . . , ζ`],
  ζ0 is built on Σi and in the remainder of the proof we assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1,
  ζ1, . . . , ζ` are built on Σ and sign(ζi) 6= Σ1.
By induction hypothesis, we know that for all i ≤ `, for all ζ ′ ∈ St(ζi), we have ζ ′σ↓ ∈
St(φ, ζiσ↓) ∪ Σ0. To conclude that ζ ′σ↓ ∈ St(φ,M) ∪ Σ0 for any ζ ′ ∈ St(ζ), it is sufficient
to show that for all i ≤ ` we have ζiσ↓ ∈ St(φ,M) ∪ Σ0.
  If sign(ζi) = ⊥, then we have ζiσ↓ ∈ St(φ) ∪ Σ0.
  If sign(ζi) = Σ2 and sign(ζiσ↓) 6= Σ2, then we conclude that ζiσ↓ ∈ St(φ) ∪ Σ0 thanks
to the induction hypothesis.
  Now, we assume that sign(ζi) = Σ2 and sign(ζiσ↓) = Σ2. We distinguish several cases.
1. ζiσ↓ ∈ St(M) ∪ Σ0. In such a case, we easily conclude.
2. ζiσ↓ ∈ St(ζjσ↓) for some j such that sign(ζjσ↓) = Σ1. By induction hypothesis,
since sign(ζj) = Σ2 6= sign(ζjσ↓), we have ζjσ↓ ∈ St(φ) ∪ Σ0. Thus ζiσ↓ ∈
St(φ) ∪ Σ0.
3. Otherwise, we show that we can build a recipe ζ ′M of M smaller than ζM . Let
∆ = {j ∈ {1, . . . , `} | ζjσ↓ = ζiσ↓}. Note that ∆ 6= ∅ since i ∈ ∆. Let
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ζ ′M = ζ
0[ζ ′1, . . . , ζ
′
`] where ζ
′
j is equal to nmin if j ∈ ∆ and to ζj otherwise. Note
that |ζ ′M | < |ζM |. Lastly, we have that ζ
′
M is a recipe of M . Indeed
ζ ′Mσ↓ = ζ
0[ζ ′1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
`σ↓]↓
= ((ζ0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓])δ(ζiσ)↓,nmin)↓ since ζiσ↓ /∈ St(ζjσ↓) for j /∈ ∆
= ((ζ0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓])↓δ(ζiσ)↓,nmin)↓ thanks to Lemma 5
= Mδ(ζiσ)↓,nmin↓ = M since ζiσ 6∈ St(M)
Moreover, assume sign(ζM ) 6= sign(ζMσ↓). Since we have that sign(ζM ) = sign(ζ0[ζ ′1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
`σ↓])
and ζ0[ζ ′1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
`σ↓]↓ = ζMσ↓ then applying Lemma 3, we get ζMσ↓ ∈ Σ0∪Fct(ζ
0[ζ ′1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
`σ↓]).
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ `, if sign(ζi) 6= sign(ζiσ↓), we have seen that ζiσ↓ ∈ St(φ)∪Σ0. We deduce
that ζMσ↓ ∈ Σ0 ∪ St(φ) ∪ {ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓}. By minimality of ζM , there exists no ζi such
that ζMσ↓ = ζiσ↓. This allows us to conclude. 
Lemma 7 Let φ be a frame and M be a ground term built on Σ and in normal form.
Let F2 = {N | N ∈ St(φ,M) and sign(N) = Σ2}, n˜F2 be a set of names, distinct from the
names occurring in φ and M , of same cardinality as F2 and ρ2 : F2 → n˜F2 be a bijection.
We have that
φ `E1 M if and only if νn˜F2 .(φ `E1 M)
ρ2 .
Proof. (⇒) Let φ = νn˜.σ. By Lemma 1, we know that there exists a term ζ on Σ1 such that
fn(ζ) ∩ n˜ = ∅ and ζσ =E1 M . Hence, we know that ζσ↓ = M . We have to show that there
exists a term ζ ′ on Σ1 such that fn(ζ
′)∩ (n˜∪ n˜F2) = ∅ and ζ
′σρ2 =E1 M
ρ2 . W.l.o.g. we can
assume that fn(ζ) ∩ n˜F2 = ∅. Let us show that the term ζ satisfies the required conditions.
Either sign(Mρ2) = ⊥ or sign(Mρ2) = Σ1. In this last case, since M is in normal form,
applying Lemma 4, we get Mρ2↓ = Mρ2↓E1 . In both cases, we get
Mρ2↓ =E1 M
ρ2 (1)
Since sign((ζσ)ρ2 ) 6= Σ2 and (ζσ)ρ2 does not contain subterms of sign Σ2 anymore, all its
factor are in normal form thus we can apply again Lemma 4, yielding to (ζσ)ρ2↓ = (ζσ)ρ2↓E1 .
We deduce
(ζσ)ρ2↓ =E1 (ζσ)
ρ2 (2)
Since all the factors of ζσ are in normal form, we can apply Lemma 5
(ζσ)ρ2↓ = (ζσ)↓ρ2↓ (3)
By equality (3) and the fact that (ζσ)↓ = M , we get (ζσ)ρ2↓ = Mρ2↓. Using equalities (1)
and (2), we deduce that (ζσ)ρ2 =E1 M
ρ2 . Now, since ζ is a term built on Σ1, we have that
(ζσ)ρ2 = ζ(σρ2 ) (syntactically). This allows us to conclude.
(⇐) By Lemma 1, we know that there exists a term ζ on Σ1 such that fn(ζ)∩(n˜∪n˜F2) = ∅ and
ζσρ2 =E1 M
ρ2 . We show that fn(ζ) ∩ n˜ = ∅ (obvious) and ζσ =E1 M . Since ζσ
ρ2 =E1 M
ρ2
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and since E1 is closed under substitution of names, we deduce that (ζσ
ρ2 )ρ
−1
2 =E1 (M
ρ2)ρ
−1
2 .
We have (Mρ2)ρ
−1
2 = M and (ζσρ2 )ρ
−1
2 = ζ((σρ2 )
ρ
−1
2 ) = ζσ since n˜F2 6∈ fn(ζ). This allows
us to conclude that ζσ =E1 M . 
We prove the following claim, that shows the correction of the saturation algorithm.
Claim: φ∗ contains exactly the set d(St(φ,M)) of all deducible subterms of St(φ,M).
φ∗ ⊆ d(St(φ,M)). We show by induction on k that φk ⊆ d(St(φ,M)). The base case
φ0 ⊆ d(St(φ,M)) is obvious. Assume now that for every U ∈ φk , U is deducible, that is
φ `E1∪E2 U . We have φk+1 = φk ∪ {T} with T ∈ St(φ,M) such that (w.l.o.g.) νn˜F2 .(φk `E1
T )ρ2 . Applying Lemma 7 we get that φk `E1 T thus φ `E1∪E2 T and φk+1 ⊆ d(St(φ,M)).
d(St(φ,M)) ⊆ φ∗. Let T ∈ St(φ,M) be some deducible term, that is φ `E1∪E2 T . Lemma 6
ensures that there exists ζ such that fn(ζ) ∩ n˜ = ∅, (ζσ)↓ = T and for all ζ ′ ∈ St(ζ), we
have ζ ′σ↓ ∈ St(φ,M) ∪ Σ0. We show by induction on |ζ| that T ∈ φ
∗.
Base case. If |ζ| ≤ 1 then either ζ is a name or a variable and we easily conclude, or ζ is
built on Σ1 or Σ2. We assume w.l.o.g. that ζ is built on Σ1. From Lemma 4 (ζσ)↓ = T
implies that (ζσ)↓E1 = T thus φ `E1 T . Applying Lemma 7, we get that νn˜F2 .(φ `E1 T )
ρ2
thus T ∈ φ∗.
Induction step. Assume ζ = ζ0[ζ1, . . . , ζk]. We have ζiσ↓ ∈ St(φ,M) ∪ Σ0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Since |ζi| ≤ |ζ|, applying the induction hypothesis, we deduce that ζiσ↓ ∈ φ∗. W.l.o.g.
we assume that sign(ζ0) = Σ1. Thus φ
∗ `E1 ζσ↓ = T . Applying Lemma 7, we get that
νn˜F2 .(φ `E1 T )
ρ2 thus T ∈ φ∗. 
B Proofs of Section 5
B.1 Adding deducible subterms
Lemma 8 Let φ1 and φ2 be two frames such that dom(φ1) = dom(φ2). For any frame ψ
such that dom(ψ) = dom(φ1), we have that
φ2
ψ
|= EqE(φ1
ψ
) if and only if φ2 |= EqE(φ1).
Proof. (⇒) Assume that φ2
ψ
|= EqE(φ1
ψ
) and consider (M,N) ∈ EqE(φ1). As (φ1
ψ
)|dom(φ1) =
φ1 and (φ2
ψ
)|dom(φ1) = φ2, it follows that (M =E N)φ1
ψ
, thus (M =E N)φ2
ψ
, that is
(M =E N)φ2.
(⇐) Conversely, assume that φ2 |= EqE(φ1) and consider (M,N) ∈ EqE(φ1
ψ
). Let φ1 =
νn˜1.σ1 and φ2 = νn˜2.σ2 such that (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ (n˜1 ∪ n˜2) = ∅. We have that φ1
ψ
=
φ1∪{t1/x1 , . . . ,
tn /xn} with ζiσ1↓ = ti. LetM
′ = Mθ andN ′ = Nθ where θ = {ζ1/x1 , . . . ,
ζn /xn}.
Since we have that ζiσ1 =E xiσ1
ψ , we deduce that M ′σ1 =E Mσ1
ψ and N ′σ1 =E Nσ1
ψ,
that is (M ′ =E N
′)φ1. Since φ2 |= EqE(φ1), we have (M
′ =E N
′)φ2. As we also have that
M ′σ2 =E Mσ2
ψ and N ′σ2 =E Nσ2
ψ (since ζiσ2 =E xiσ2
ψ), we conclude that (M =E N)φ2
ψ
.

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Lemma 9 Let φ be a frame such that φ
φ
= φ and ψ be any frame such that dom(ψ) =
dom(φ). Let φ′ = φ
ψ
. We have that φ′ contains all its deducible subterms, i.e. φ′
φ′
= φ′.
Proof. Let φ = νn˜.σ and ψ = νn˜.σ′ for some sequence of names n˜ and some substitutions σ
and σ′. By construction, we have that φ′ = φ∪{ζ1σ↓/x1 , . . . ,
ζnσ↓ /xn} where ζi are such that
ζiσ
′↓ ∈ St(ψ). We assume w.l.o.g. that for every i, we have that ζi satisfies the hypothesis of
the Lemma 6 (locality lemma), i.e. for all ζ ′ ∈ St(ζi), we have that ζ ′σ′↓ ∈ St(ψ). Moreover,
we also assume that terms have been introduced in the frame obeying the following ordering
condition: Let ζi and ζj be two terms such that ζiσ
′↓ ∈ St(ψ) and ζjσ′↓ ∈ St(ψ). If
ζi ∈ St(ζj) then i < j. Now, to conclude, it remains to show that for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) we
have
St(ζiσ↓) ⊆ St(φ) ∪ {
ζ1σ↓/x1 , . . . ,
ζiσ↓ /xi}. (?)
Let i0 be the first indice for which condition (?) is violated. Hence, there exists M such that
M ∈ St(ζi0σ↓) and M 6∈ St(φ) ∪ {
ζ1σ↓/x1 , . . . ,
ζi0σ↓ /xi0}. We have that ζi0 = ζ
0[ζ1, . . . , ζ`]
where ζ1, . . . , ζ` are the factors of ζi. By construction, we know that condition (?) is satisfied
for ζ1, . . . , ζ`. Hence, we have that St(ζjσ↓) ⊆ St(φ)∪{ζ1σ↓/x1 , . . . ,
ζi0σ↓ /xi0} for any j such
that 1 ≤ j ≤ `.
We consider the term ζ0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓] and we have that its factors are in normal form.
We can apply Lemma 3. Hence, we are in one of the two cases described below:
1. ζi0σ↓ ∈ Σ0 ∪ Fct(ζ
0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓]) ⊆ St(φ) ∪ St({ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓}).
2. Fct(ζi0σ↓) ⊆ Σ0 ∪ Fct(ζ
0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓]) ⊆ St(φ) ∪ St({ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓}).
In both cases, we obtain a contradiction with the fact that i0 is the first indice for which
condition (?) is violated. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 10 Let φ be a frame such that φ
φ
= φ and ψ be a frame such that ψ |= EqE1(φ)
and ψ |= EqE2(φ). Let (M,N) ∈ EqE(φ) and assume that for all terms M
′, N ′ such that
(M ′, N ′) < (M,N), we have that
(M ′ =E N
′)φ⇒ (M ′ =E N ′)ψ.
Let φ = νn˜.σ such that (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ n˜ = ∅. If there exists ζ ∈ St(M) such
that sign(ζσ) 6= sign(ζσ↓), then there exists M1 such that |M1| < |M |, (M =E M1)φ
and (M =E M1)ψ.
Proof. Let (M,N) ∈ EqE(φ) and φ = νn˜.σ such that (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ n˜ = ∅. W.l.o.g. we
assume |M | ≥ |N |. We prove this result by induction on |M |. Note that when |M | = 0, i.e.
M is a variable or a nonce, the result is obvious since (M,N) ∈ EqE1(φ) or (M,N) ∈ EqE2(φ).
Now, we know that that there exists ζ0, ζ1, . . . , ζ` such that:
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  M = ζ0[ζ1, . . . , ζ`],
  ζ0 is built on Σi and in the remainder of the proof we assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1.
Moreover, we know that ζ0 is not reduced to a variable or a name.
  ζ1, . . . , ζ` are built on Σ and sign(ζi) 6= Σ1.
We distinguish three cases.
First case: There exists i (1 ≤ i ≤ `) and ζ ′ ∈ St(ζi) such that sign(ζ ′σ) 6= sign(ζ ′σ↓).
By induction hypothesis we know that there exists ζ ′i such that |ζ
′
i | < |ζi|, (ζ
′
i =E ζi)φ and
(ζ ′i =E ζi)ψ. Let M1 = ζ
0[ζ1, . . . , ζ
′
i , . . . , ζ`]. We have that |M1| < |M |, (M1 =E M)φ and
(M1 =E M)ψ.
Second case: There exists ζi such that sign(ζi) = Σ2 and ζiσ↓ ∈ St(φ). This means that
ζiσ↓ is a deducible subterm. Thus there exists x ∈ dom(φ) such that (x =E ζi)φ. Since
(ζi, x) < (M,N), we deduce that (ζi =E x)ψ. Let M
′ = ζ0[ζ1, . . . , x, . . . , ζ`]. We have that
|M ′| < |M |, (M =E M ′)φ and (M =E M ′)ψ.
Third case: We know that sign(ζiσ) = sign(ζiσ↓) for every i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ `. Moreover,
if sign(ζi) 6= ⊥, we have that ζiσ↓ 6∈ St(φ). In addition, since by hypothesis there exists ζ ∈
St(M) such that sign(ζσ) 6= sign(ζσ↓), we must have ζ = M thus sign(Mσ) 6= sign(Mσ↓).
Now, either (Case (a)) there is no ζi such that sign(ζi) = Σ2 meaning that Mσ has all
its factor in normal form, thus applying Lemma 3, we have Mσ↓ ∈ St(φ) ∪ Σ0 ⊆ St(φ) since
φ
φ
= φ.
  Either there exists x ∈ dom(φ) such that (M =E x)φ. Thanks to Lemma 4, we deduce
that (M =E1 x)φ and hence we have that (M,x) ∈ EqE1(φ). Since ψ ∈ EqE1(φ), we
have also (M =E1 x)ψ, thus (M =E x)ψ. Let M1 = x, we easily conclude.
  Or there exists n ∈ N , such that Mσ↓ = n. Thanks to Lemma 4, we have that
(M =E1 n)φ. Since ψ |= EqE1(φ), we deduce that (M =E1 n)ψ and hence (M =E n)ψ.
Let M1 = n, we easily conclude.
Otherwise (Case (b)), let ∆ = {ζiσ↓ | sign(ζi) = Σ2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ `}. Let t1, . . . , tk be the
elements of ∆ ordered in such a way that if ti is a syntactic subterm of tj then j < i. Let
n1, . . . , nk be some new nonces that do not appear in φ nor ψ. Let δi = δti,ni for every i
such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
By applying successively Lemma 5, we obtain
((ζ0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓]δ1) . . . δk)↓ = (((Mσ↓)δ1↓) . . .)δk↓ (4)
Let M ′ = ζ0[ζ ′1, . . . , ζ
′
`] where ζ
′
i = ζi if ζiσ↓ 6∈ ∆ and ζ
′
i = nj if ζiσ↓ = tj . We
have that ((ζ0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓]δ1) . . . δk) = ζ0[ζ ′1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
`σ↓] =E M
′σ. In addition, since
sign(ζ0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓]) 6= sign(Mσ↓) and ζ0[ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζ`σ↓] has all its factors in normal
form, applying Lemma 3, we get Mσ↓ ∈ ∆ ∪ St(φ) (note that Σ0 ⊆ St(φ)). From the
equality (4) we can deduce that
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  either Mσ↓ = tj for some tj (1 ≤ j ≤ k) and we have (M
′ =E nj)φ,
  or Mσ↓ ∈ St(φ) and in such a case, we know that there exists x ∈ dom(φ) such that
Mσ↓ = xσ. Hence we have that (M ′ =E x)φ.
In both case, we have obtain an equality in EqE1(φ) and thanks to the fact that ψ |=
EqE1(φ), we deduce that either (M
′ =E1 nj)ψ (Case 1) or (M
′ =E1 x)ψ (Case 2). For every
i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let ∆i = {ζj | ζjσ↓ = ti and 1 ≤ j ≤ `} and let ζ
i ∈ ∆i. We denote
by δ′ the following replacement:
δ′ = {n1 7→ ζ
1σ′↓, . . . , nk 7→ ζ
kσ′↓}.
Claim: For every i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ `, we have that (ζ ′iσ
′↓)δ′ = ζiσ′↓.
Indeed either ζ ′i = ζi and we easily conclude. Otherwise we have that ζ
′
i = np for some p
such that 1 ≤ p ≤ k and we know that (ζi =E ζ
p)φ. By induction hypothesis, we deduce
that (ζi =E ζ
p)ψ. Hence, we have that (ζ ′iσ
′↓)δ′ = (npσ′↓)δ′ = ζpσ′↓ = ζiσ′↓.
(Case 1) We have that (M =E ζ
j)φ. Note also that |ζj | < |M |. Hence, it remains to show
that (M =E ζ
j)ψ. We have shown that (M ′ =E1 nj)ψ, this means that ζ
0[ζ ′1σ
′↓, . . . , ζ ′`σ
′↓] =E
nj . Since E is closed under substitution of names, we have that ζ
0[(ζ ′1σ
′↓)δ′, . . . , (ζ ′1σ
′↓)δ′] =E
ζjσ′↓. Using our claim, we obtain that ζ0[ζ1σ
′↓, . . . , ζ`σ
′↓] =E ζ
jσ′↓. Hence, we deduce that
(M =E ζ
j)ψ.
(Case 2) We have that (M =E x)φ. Since |x| < |M |, it remains to show that (M =E x)ψ.
We have shown that (M ′ =E1 x)ψ, this means that ζ
0[ζ ′1σ
′↓, . . . , ζ ′`σ
′↓] =E xσ′. Since E
is closed under substitution of names, we have that ζ0[(ζ ′1σ
′↓)δ′, . . . , (ζ ′1σ
′↓)δ′] =E xσ′↓.
By using our claim, we obtain that ζ0[ζ1σ
′↓, . . . , ζ`σ′↓] =E xσ′↓. Hence, we easily deduce
that (M =E x)ψ. 
Proposition 1 Let φ and ψ be two frames such that φ
φ
= φ. We have that ψ |= EqE(φ) if
and only if ψ |= EqE1(φ) and ψ |= EqE2(φ).
Proof. (⇒) Since EqE1(φ) ⊆ EqE(φ) and EqE2(φ) ⊆ EqE(φ) and thanks to Lemma 4 we have
that ψ |= EqE(φ) implies ψ |= EqEi(φ) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
(⇐) Conversely, let ψ = νn˜.σ′ be a frame such that ψ |= EqE1(φ) and ψ |= EqE2(φ). Let
(M,N) ∈ EqE(φ) and φ = νn˜.σ for some substitution σ. We prove, by induction on the size
of (M,N), that (M =E N)ψ. We assume w.l.o.g. that M is such that |M | ≥ |N |.
Base case: |M |+|N | ≤ 1. This means thatM andN are variables, names or terms built only
on Σ1 or Σ2 and only M can satisfy sign(M) 6= ⊥. In such a case, either (M,N) ∈ EqE1(φ)
or (M,N) ∈ EqE2(φ) and we conclude by applying our hypothesis.
Induction step: We know that |M | ≥ 1. This means that there exist ζ0M , ζ
1
M , . . . , ζ
`
M such
that
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  M = ζ0M [ζ
1
M , . . . , ζ
`
M ],
  ζ0M is built on Σi and in the remainder of the proof we will assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1,
  ζ1M , . . . , ζ
`
M are built on Σ and sign(ζ
i
M ) 6= Σ1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
and we know also that there exist ζ0N , ζ
1
N , . . . , ζ
p
N such that
  N = ζ0N [ζ
1
N , . . . , ζ
p
N ],
  ζ0N is built on Σi and in the remainder of the proof we will assume that sign(ζ
0
N ) 6= 2
since if sign(Mσ) 6= sign(Nσ) we easily conclude, thanks to Lemma 10, by noticing
that either sign(Mσ) 6= sign(Mσ↓) or sign(Nσ) 6= sign(Nσ↓).
  ζ1N , . . . , ζ
p
N are built on Σ and sign(ζ
i
N ) 6= Σ1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
Note that the sets {ζ1M , . . . , ζ
`
M} and {ζ
1
N , . . . , ζ
p
N} might be empty.
We distinguish several cases.
Case 1: If there exists ζiM (or ζ
i
N ) such that sign(ζ
i
Mσ) 6= sign(ζ
i
Mσ↓). In such a case,
we can apply Lemma 10 on ζiM . We deduce that there exists U such that |U | < |ζ
i
M |,
(U =E ζ
i
M )φ and (U =E ζ
i
M )ψ. Let M
′ = ζ0M [ζ
1
M , . . . , U, . . . , ζ
`
M ]. We have that (M =E M
′)φ
and (M =E M
′)ψ. Applying our induction hypothesis on (M ′, N), we obtain (M ′ =E N)ψ.
Thus we deduce that (M =E N)ψ.
Case 2: If there exists ζiM (or ζ
i
N ) such that sign(ζ
i
M ) = Σ2 and ζ
i
Mσ↓ ∈ St(φ). This means
that ζiMσ↓ is a deducible subterm. Thus there exists x ∈ dom(φ) such that (ζ
i
M =E x)φ.
Let M ′ = ζ0M [ζ
1
M , . . . , x, . . . , ζ
`
M ]. We have that (M =E M
′)φ and (M =E M
′)ψ. Now, we
apply our induction hypothesis on (M ′, N). We obtain that (M ′ =E N)ψ and we deduce
that (M =E N)ψ.
Case 3: We have that sign(ζ iMσ) = sign(ζ
i
Mσ↓) for every i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ ` and also that
sign(ζiNσ) = sign(ζ
i
Nσ↓) for every i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ p. Moreover, if sign(ζ
i
M ) 6= ⊥ (resp.
sign(ζiN ) 6= ⊥), we have that ζ
i
Mσ↓ 6∈ St(φ) (resp. ζ
i
Nσ↓ 6∈ St(φ)).
Consider among the ζiM , ζ
j
N such that sign(ζ
i
M ) = Σ2, sign(ζ
j
N ) = Σ2, one such that
ζiMσ↓, ζ
j
Nσ↓ is maximal w.r.t. the syntactic subterm ordering. Note that if such a ζ
i
M (or
ζjN ) does not exist then we have that (M,N) ∈ EqE1(φ) and we conclude using the fact that
ψ |= EqE1(φ). In that case, we obtain (M =E1 N)ψ thus (M =E N)ψ. So, let ζX be such a
term.
Let ∆ = {ζ ∈ {ζ1M , . . . , ζ
`
M , ζ
1
N , . . . , ζ
p
N} | ζσ↓ = ζXσ↓} and n be a new name. Let
M ′ = ζ0M [ζ
′1
M , . . . , ζ
′`
M ] and N
′ = ζ0N [ζ
′1
N , . . . , ζ
′p
N ] where
  ζ ′iM is equal to n if ζ
i
M ∈ ∆ and to ζ
i
M otherwise, and
  ζ ′iN is equal to n if ζ
i
N ∈ ∆ and to ζ
i
N otherwise.
Let δ = δζXσ↓,n. Since Mσ↓ = Nσ↓, we have (Mσ↓)δ↓ = (Nσ↓)δ↓. Moreover, thanks to
Lemma 5, we have also that
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  (ζ0M [ζ
1
Mσ↓, . . . , ζ
`
Mσ↓])δ↓ = (Mσ↓)δ↓, i.e. M
′σ↓ = (Mσ↓)δ↓,
  (ζ0N [ζ
1
Nσ↓, . . . , ζ
p
Nσ↓])δ↓ = (Nσ↓)δ↓, i.e. N
′σ↓ = (Nσ↓)δ↓.
Hence, we have that (M ′, N ′) ∈ EqE(φ). Since (M
′, N ′) < (M,N), by induction hypothesis,
we obtain (M ′ =E N
′)ψ.
Let δ′ = δn,ζXσ′↓.
Claim: For every i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ ` (resp. 1 ≤ i ≤ p), we have that (ζ ′iMσ
′↓)δ′ = ζiMσ
′↓
(resp. (ζ ′iNσ
′↓)δ′ = ζiNσ
′↓).
Indeed either ζ ′iM = ζ
i
M and we easily conclude. Otherwise we have that ζ
′i
M = n and we
know that (ζiM =E ζX )φ. By induction hypothesis (since (ζ
i
M , ζX) < (M,N)), we deduce
that (ζiM =E ζX)ψ. Hence we have (ζ
′i
Mσ
′↓)δ′ = ζXσ′↓ = ζiMσ
′↓.
We have shown that (M ′ =E N
′)ψ. Hence we have that
ζ0M [ζ
′1
Mσ
′↓, . . . , ζ ′`Mσ
′↓] =E ζ
0
N [ζ
′1
Nσ
′↓, . . . , ζ ′pNσ
′↓].
Since E is closed under substitution of names, we deduce that
ζ0M [(ζ
′1
Mσ
′↓)δ′, . . . , (ζ ′`Mσ
′↓)δ′] =E ζ
0
N [(ζ
′1
Nσ
′↓)δ′, . . . , (ζ ′pNσ
′↓)δ′].
By using our claim, we obtain that
ζ0M [ζ
1
Mσ
′↓, . . . , ζ`Mσ
′↓] =E ζ
0
N [ζ
1
Nσ
′↓, . . . , ζpNσ
′↓].
Hence we deduce that (M =E N)ψ. 
B.3 Abstracting alien subterms
Lemma 11 Let φ and ψ be two frames built on Σ and in normal form. Let F2 = {N ∈
St(φ ∪ ψ) | sign(N) = Σ2}, n˜F2 be a set of names, distinct from the names occurring in φ
and ψ, of same cardinality as F2 and ρ2 : F2 → n˜F a replacement. We have that
φ |= EqE1(ψ) if and only if νn˜F2 .φ
ρ2 |= EqE1(νn˜F2 .ψ
ρ2)
Proof. (⇒) Let (M,N) ∈ EqE1(νn˜F .ψ
ρ2 ). We have to show (M =E1 N)φ
ρ2 . Since (M =E1
N)ψρ2 and since E1 is closed under substitution of names, we deduce that ((M =E1 N)ψ
ρ2)ρ2
−1
.
Moreover, we have that
  (Mψρ2)ρ2
−1
= M(ψρ2)ρ2
−1
= Mψ since n˜F 6∈ fn(M), and
  (Nψρ2)ρ2
−1
= N(ψρ2)ρ2
−1
= Nψ since n˜F 6∈ fn(N).
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This allows us to obtain that (M =E1 N)ψ. Now, thanks to the fact that φ |= EqE1(ψ), we
deduce that (M =E1 N)φ. Let φ = νn˜.σ. We have that Mσ↓ = Nσ↓. Since sign((Mσ)
ρ2 ) 6=
Σ2 and (Mσ)
ρ2 does not contain subterms of sign Σ2, all its factors are in normal form.
Thus, we can apply Lemma 4, yielding to (Mσ)ρ2↓ = (Mσ)ρ2↓E1 . We deduce that
(Mσ)ρ2↓ =E1 (Mσ)
ρ2 (5)
In the same way, we can obtain (Nσ)ρ2↓ =E1 (Nσ)
ρ2 .
Since all the factors of Mσ and Nσ are in normal form, we can apply Lemma 5 , yielding
to
(Mσ)ρ2↓ = (Mσ)↓ρ2↓ (Nσ)ρ2↓ = (Nσ)↓ρ2↓ (6)
By the equalities (6) and the fact that Mσ↓ = Nσ↓, we obtain that (Mσ)ρ2↓ =
(Nσ)↓ρ2↓ = (Nσ)ρ2↓. Now, using equalities (5), we obtain that (Mσ)ρ2 =E1 (Nσ)
ρ2 . Now,
since M and N are terms built on Σ1, we have that (Mσ)
ρ2 = M(σρ2) and (Nσ)ρ2 = N(σρ2 )
(syntactically). This allows us to conclude.
(⇐) Let (M,N) ∈ EqE1(ψ). We have to show that (M =E1 N)φ. Firstly, we can assume
w.l.o.g. that (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ n˜F = ∅. Let ψ = νn˜.σ.
Since sign((Mσ)ρ2 ) 6= Σ2 and (Mσ)ρ2 does not contain subterms of sign Σ2, all its factors
are in normal form. Thus, we can apply Lemma 4, yielding to (Mσ)ρ2↓ = (Mσ)ρ2↓E1 . We
deduce that
(Mσ)ρ2↓ =E1 (Mσ)
ρ2 (7)
In the same way, we obtain (Nσ)ρ2↓ =E1 (Nσ)
ρ2 .
Since all the factors of Mσ and Nσ are in normal form, we can apply Lemma 5 , yielding
to
(Mσ)ρ2↓ = (Mσ)↓ρ2↓ (Nσ)ρ2↓ = (Nσ)↓ρ2↓ (8)
By the equalities (8) and the fact that Mσ↓ = Nσ↓, we obtain that (Mσ)ρ2↓ =
(Nσ)↓ρ2↓ = (Nσ)ρ2↓. Now, using equalities (7), we obtain that (Mσ)ρ2 =E1 (Nσ)
ρ2 . Now,
since M and N are terms built on Σ1, we have that (Mσ)
ρ2 = M(σρ2) and (Nσ)ρ2 = N(σρ2 )
(syntactically). Hence, we obtain that (M =E1 N)ψ
ρ2 . Since νn˜F .φ
ρ2 |= EqE1(νn˜F .ψ
ρ2), we
deduce that (M =E1 N)φ
ρ2 . Since E1 is closed under substitution of names, we deduce that
((M =E1 N)φ
ρ2 )ρ2
−1
. We have (Mφρ2)ρ2
−1
= M(φρ2 )ρ2
−1
= Mφ since n˜F ∩ fn(M) = ∅.
For the same reason, we have that (Nφρ2 )ρ2
−1
= Nφ. This allows us to conclude. 
B.4 Complexity
Let φ1 and φ2 be two frames. Let φ
′
1 = (φ1
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
and φ′2 = (φ2
φ2
)
(φ1
φ2 )
.
Assume that
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  φ `E M can be decided in f3(tdag(φ) + tdag(M)),
  a recipe ζ such that (ζ =E M)φ can be computed in f4(tdag(φ)+ tdag(M)) and that we
control the size of the recipe tdag(ζ) ≤ f5(tdag(φ) + tdag(M))
  φ ≈Ei ψ can be decided in fi(tdag(φ) + tdag(M)) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
We also assume that the fi are non-decreasing functions.
Let h : N → N such that h(x) = x(f3(2x) + f4(2x)). Let g : N × N → N such that
g(x, y) = x(f5(2y) + x).
Claim 1 Let φ be a frame. φ
φ
can be computed in time tdag(φ)f3(2tdag(φ)). Moreover,
tdag(φ
φ
) ≤ tdag(φ).
Computing φ
φ
is equivalent to computing the deducible subterms of φ. That is, for each
M in St(φ), we check whether φ `E M , which can be performed in f3(tdag(φ) + tdag(M)) ≤
f3(2tdag(φ)). Thus φ
φ
can be computed in time tdag(φ)f3(2tdag(φ)). Moreover, since only
subterms of φ are added in φ
φ
, the DAG-size does not change thus tdag(φ
φ
) ≤ tdag(φ). 
Claim 2 Let φ and ψ be two frames. φ
ψ
can be computed in time h(tdag(ψ)). Moreover,
tdag(φ
ψ
) ≤ g(tdag(φ), tdag(ψ)).
To compute φ
ψ
we have to check, for each M in St(ψ) whether ψ `E M , which can be
performed in f3(tdag(ψ)+ tdag(M)) ≤ f3(2tdag(ψ)). Whenever ψ `E M , we have to compute
a recipe for M , which can be done in f4(tdag(ψ) + tdag(M)) ≤ f4(2tdag(ψ)). Altogether
we deduce that φ
ψ
can be computed in time h(tdag(ψ)). Moreover, tdag(φ
ψ
) ≤ tdag(φ) +
|ψ|(f5(tdag(ψ)) + tdag(φ)) ≤ g(tdag(φ), tdag(ψ)). 
We deduce that φ1
φ2
can be computed in time h(tdag(φ2)) and φ
′
1 can be computed in
time h(tdag(φ2)) + tdag(φ1
φ2
)f3(2tdag(φ1
φ2
)) that is φ′1 can be computed in time at most
h(tdag(φ2)) + g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2))f3(2g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2))) (9)
Moreover tdag(φ
′
1) ≤ tdag(φ1
φ2
)≤g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2)).
Similarly, φ2
φ2
can be computed in time tdag(φ2)f3(2tdag(φ2)). Thus φ
′
2 can be computed
in time tdag(φ2)f3(2tdag(φ2)) + h(tdag(φ1
φ2
)) that is φ′2 can be computed in time at most
tdag(φ2)f3(2tdag(φ2)) + h(g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2))) (10)
Moreover tdag(φ
′
2) ≤ g(tdag(φ2), g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2))).
Since abstracting alien subterms make the size decrease, we get that checking whether
n˜F2 .(φ
′
1)
ρ2 ≈E1 n˜F2 .(φ
′
2)
ρ2 can be computed in time at most
f1(g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2)) + g(tdag(φ2), g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2)))) (11)
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and whether n˜F1 .(φ
′
1)
ρ1 ≈E2 n˜F1 .(φ
′
2)
ρ1 can be computed in time at most
f2(g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2)) + g(tdag(φ2), g(tdag(φ1), tdag(φ2)))) (12)
Altogether, the complexity of checking whether φ1 ≈E φ2 is obtained by summing the
four values (9) +(10) + (11) +(12).
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